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Abstract
This paper develops a hierarchical principal-agent model to explore the inﬂu-
ence of corruption, bribery, and politically provided oversight of production on the
eﬃciency and level of output of some publicly provided good. Under full informa-
tion, an honest politician acheives the ﬁrst best while a dishonest politician creates
shortages and bribes. Under asymmetric information, however, an honest politician
might create more shortages relative to a dishonest one, although, the latter cre-
ates greater bribes. Furthermore, the contracted output can be greater or smaller
relative to that produced by an unregulated private monopolist. The model iden-
tiﬁes a tradeoﬀ between bribery and allocative eﬃciency. This helps to reconcile
some conﬂicting results on the implications of corruption for the size of the public
sector and provides new results on the circumstances under which an improvement
in the auditing technology is beneﬁcial. Relative to the static case, in the dynamic
renegotiation-proof equilibrium, shortages fall but bribes can increase or decrease,
raising important issues of the choice between long-term and short-term contracts.
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This paper develops a hierarchical principal-agent model to explore the inﬂuence of cor-
ruption, bribery, and politically provided oversight of production on the eﬃciency and
level of output of some publicly provided good.
Consider the following generic situation. A possibly corrupt politician regulates a
corrupt, monopolist1, intermediary who provides some output or service to ﬁnal consumers;
the regulatory contract has the following essential features.
1. The politician enforces an oﬃcial price which can be charged by the intermediary.
2. The contract speciﬁes the volume of output to be sold by the intermediary.
3. The politician can freely audit the intermediary.
This regulatory framework characterizes at least two generic situations.
Example 1 : The monopolist intermediary is an arm of the government, a public-agent,
who supplies a ‘public output’ on behalf of the government. The public-agent could,
for instance, be a civil servant or an executive branch of the government. There is no
presumption that the output supplied by the pubic-agent has the nature of a public good.
Example 2 : The intermediary is a monopolist private ﬁrm that supplies some ‘private
output’. In particular, the private ﬁrm is not an arm of the government.
While the interpretations in Examples 1 and 2 are both plausible, we feel that the
interpretation in Example 1 is more natural for the following reason. Whilst regulatory
conditions (1) and (2) above are often observed separately in regulation of private ﬁrms,
their simultaneous occurrence is less frequent. Furthermore, the government is constrained
in several respects when it audits private ﬁrms, for instance, on account of various conﬁ-
dentiality clauses while it, as the notional owner on behalf of the citizens, has much greater
powers in auditing public-agents. For these reasons, we will conduct our analysis within
the context of Example 1 and interpret the intermediary, a public-agent, as an arm of the
government. However, it is worth bearing in mind the interpretation given in Example 2.
1Possible normative explanations for the conferment of such monopoly rights might include market
failures, merit goods, national security, national goals, homogeneity of standards or feasibility, issues. For
many public outputs such as passports, industrial licenses etc. there are strong grounds for giving control
to a single provider; see Bardhan (1997). The positive explanations view the conferment of such legal
rights as a device to generate political rents; for example Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1993) and Coolidge
and Rose-Ackerman (1997). The eﬀect of competition on corruption is not considered here but see Rose-
Ackerman (1999) and Laﬀont and Guessan (1999). There is a sense in which the competiton results of
Laﬀont and Guessan (1999) can be applied to this paper; see Section 4 below.
11.1. Scarcity rents and shortages
The combination of a monopolist, and corrupt, public-agent is often cited as the reason
for the existence of scarcity rents and shortages of public output in the literature; for
instance Aidt (2003) and Bardhan (1997). Private individuals often require the consent
of a monopolist public-agent to engage in some intermediate or ﬁnal economic activity,
the actual demand for which often exceeds its supply. The public-agent then charges a
price in excess of the oﬃcial price (scarcity rent per unit), to clear the market. Scarcity
rents are extensively documented for a wide range of activities such as industrial licenses,
export-import licenses, public housing, irrigation water, passports, driving licenses, public
credit, exchange rates and old age pensions, in developed and developing countries2.
There are two main competing explanations of shortages and scarcity rents. In queuing
models, for example Lui (1985), waiting in a queue for a public output is costly. The
objective is to ﬁnd the Nash equilibrium in bribing strategies for individuals who can pay
bribes, in order to jump the queue. However, the results are very sensitive to the diﬀerent
methods of organizing the queue and are not robust to plausible extensions; see for example
Bardhan (1997).
In the other explanation, due to Shleifer and Vishny (1993), the government has full
information on the cost/ demand conditions facing a monopolist public-agent who provides
a non-contractible public output. Hence, the public-agent sells the monopoly output and
collects a scarcity rent equal to the monopoly proﬁt. However, under full information, the
monopoly proﬁts are public information, so charging the public-agent a transfer/ franchise
fee equal to the monopoly proﬁt, at all output levels, ensures the ﬁrst best, removal of
corruption and an improvement in welfare. Corruption would then be non-distortionary,
a prediction rejected by the empirical evidence; for example Mauro (1995).
One of the aims of this paper is to provide an extension of the basic Shleifer-Vishny
model that enables an equilibrium with shortages and scarcity rents to be supported.
1.2. Basic building blocks of the model
1.2.1. The public-agent is better informed about costs
The notion that the government has access to information on all relevant aspects of the
operation of a public-agent is quite strong; see for example, Acemoglu and Verdier (2000).
Public-agents are likely to have superior information on, for instance, the physical and
2See Rose-Ackerman (1999: Chapter 2) and UNDP (1997) for examples from Russia/ E. Europe, United
States, Hong-Kong, Phillipines and Pakistan. Also see Bardhan (1984) for the much-maligned ‘License-
Raj’ in India and Mbaku (2000) for a range of examples from the African continent, but especially Nigeria
and Ghana. Levine and Satarov (2000) illustrate the experience of transition economies, especially Russia,
with respect to scarcity rents. Other speciﬁc instances of this form of corruption can be found in Krueger
(1974), Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1993), Tanzi (1998) and Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman (1997).
2managerial technology used for producing the public output or indeed on their competence
in using it. Insofar as these factors impinge mainly on costs, we assume that the public-
agent has private information on costs. There are two types of public-agents, a low-cost
type, cL, and a high-cost type, cH.
The costs in the model can be interpreted either as production or provision costs.
In one possible interpretation, the public-agent engages directly in the production of the
public output. However, in several examples of scarcity rents cited above, the public-
agent engages in provision of the public output. Provision costs can of course be high,
for instance, in the provision of scarce housing when expensive ‘means testing’ needs to
be done. Or in the provision of industrial licenses where detailed feasibility studies and
compliance criteria need to be checked.
Provision costs can also be small (relative to the costs of production which are sunk),
nevertheless it is on the basis of the provision costs that the public-agent takes his decision.
Essentially, the marginal costs, not the ﬁxed costs, condition the corruption decision of the
public-agent. Hence, ineﬃciencies or distortions might arise on account of these ‘small’
costs of provision. Furthermore, our results do not crucially hinge on the magnitude of
the costs cL and cH; the important condition is cH >c L.
Costs of provision among public-agents can diﬀer for several reasons. For instance,
the public-agent can be particularly ineﬃcient in processing the available information,
or might lack in experience and insist on undertaking detailed means testing, feasibility
studies and checking in minute detail all compliance criteria so that the costs in terms of
resources or time foregone are very high. Also, a particularly conscientious public-agent
could have high costs for similar reasons. Since ‘competence’ and ‘conscience’ are deep
personal characteristics, cost becomes private information for the public-agent. We use
the eﬃcient/ ineﬃcient terminology to refer to types cL and cH respectively.
1.2.2. Public output is often observable and veriﬁable
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) assume that the government cannot contract on the quantity
sold by the public-agent. However, in the current context, the converse assumption is
often more realistic for the following reasons. First, for many types of outputs supplied by
public-agents, the transaction must be oﬃcially recorded to be of any use to the consumer.
Thus, for instance, public housing is of limited use if it is not oﬃcially issued; the same
also applies to a passport, and several forms of industrial and export-import licenses. Once
oﬃcially recorded, the output sold by the public-agent is fully observed by the government
and can be contracted upon; indeed, it is common practice for governments to set quantity
3targets for public-agents in both developed and developing countries3. Second, although
the government often mandates the price at which the public-agent is required to sell its
output4, it typically does not observe the actual price charged by the public-agent when
the latter is dishonest. Indeed, the evidence suggests that when public output is scarce,
public-agents often resort to scarcity rents in order to clear the market.
1.2.3. Dynamic considerations
In mechanism design games of the sort considered in this paper, where the government
tries to elicit the public-agent’s hidden information by a choice of contracted output,
a dynamic setting raises issues of renegotiation. Once the type of the public-agent is
revealed, then the government can implement the ﬁrst best contracts in subsequent periods.
Anticipating such action in the future, the public-agent might not be willing to reveal
hidden information, or might require additional information rents to do so. However, this
distorts the contracts predicted by the static game.
1.3. Other features of the model
The politician reimburses the public-agent’s cost using non-distortionary taxation, in-
structs the latter to sell at some oﬃcial price and contracts on its output. The public-
agent engages in bribery by selling at a price above the oﬃcial price5. An exogenously
given auditing technology allows the politician to discover hard evidence of such bribery
with some probability ρ>0. However, in return for a share in the bribe, certain kinds of
politicians, the venal ones, are willing to hide evidence of the bribe. Decent politicians,
on the other hand, eschew such corrupt side transactions. The ‘degree of venality’ of the
politician is a parameter of her preferences. We characterize and analyze the comparative
static properties of contracted output and bribes under these conditions.
1.4. Results
Under full information, shortages and corruption occur only if the politician is venal.
Decent politicians, by virtue of their ability to contract on output, produce the ﬁrst best
3Quantity targets can be explicit or implicit; in the latter case, ﬁxing the budgetary allocation to a
executive department implicitly deﬁnes the quantity that can be supplied.
4Governments routinely announce an oﬃcial price (or require the public-agent to announce one) at
which the public-agent’s output will be sold. Examples include an oﬃcial price for passports/ permits/
licenses or an oﬃcial interest rate for borrowing from public ﬁnancial institutions etc.
5The politician is able to contract on the oﬃcial price, but not the unoﬃcial price. The latter might
be considered a form of contractual incompleteness in the model. However, “incomplete contracts” are
usually discussed in the context of legal activity. Of course, illegal or illicit activity could also be considered
a form of contractual incompleteness. But we think it is useful, and in line with standard practice, to
distinguish between legal but incomplete contracting on the one hand and illicit activity on the other.
4outcome. This is in contrast to Shleifer and Vishny (1993) where bribery can occur even
when the politician is decent because the latter cannot contract on output. Furthermore,
under full information, the contracted output always exceeds that produced by a private
unregulated monopolist.
Under asymmetric information, each type of politician creates shortages in order to
limit information rents. Whilst limiting information rents is the primary focus of a decent
politician, however, a venal politician, in addition, also cares about the bribes that he
gets. For this reason, a venal politician creates further distortions in contracted output
(in addition to those that arise from the desire to limit information rents). The direction
of these distortions depends on the relation of the contracted output to that produced by
a private unregulated monopolist. Because the direction of these distortions depends on
the parameters, the asymmetric information case gives new insights relative to the full
information case. Furthermore, it helps to reconcile apparently conﬂicting results on the
eﬀects of corruption on the size of the public sector.
An improvement in the auditing technology lowers the private marginal cost of a unit
of bribes to the dishonest politician and increases her bargaining power. The dishonest
politician then distorts output in the direction of increasing bribes. However, the distortion
of output can, depending on the parameter values, be eﬃciency enhancing or eﬃciency
reducing. In the former case, it creates tradeoﬀs, in welfare terms, between the bribe
increasing (cost) and the eﬃciency enhancing (beneﬁt) aspect of changes in the monitoring
technology.
The analysis of the dynamic game follows Hart and Tirole (1988) and Laﬀont and
Tirole (1993). Relative to the static case, in the dynamic renegotiation-proof equilibrium,
shortages fall but bribes can either increase or decrease. This suggests important determi-
nants of the choice between oﬀering short-term and long-term contracts to public-agents.
The type of equilibrium expected to prevail in the dynamic game, namely, hybrid, fully
separating or fully pooling, depends on the time discount factor of the public-agent.
1.5. Schematic outline
The schematic outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the static model and
Section 3 solves it in the benchmark case of full information. Section 4 derives the solution
to the static model under asymmetric information. Section 5 analyzes the problem in its
dynamic version, in the presence of renegotiation. Finally, some conclusions are presented
in Section 6. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
52. The Model
An upper-tier of the government, referred to by the generic term, politician, contracts a
monopolist lower-tier of the government, referred to by the generic name, public-agent,
to supply some good or service, on its behalf, to ﬁnal consumers. The publicly known
inverse demand curve facing the public-agent is given by p(q) where p is the price, and q
is the demand. The demand curve is downward sloping i.e. p0 < 0. The cost curve of the
public-agent is given by C (q)=cq,w h e r ec>0 is the constant marginal cost.
The marginal cost c is privately known to the public-agent and is referred to as her
‘type’. The type space is given by the discrete set Θ = {cH,c L} where cH >c L and the
subscripts ‘H’a n d‘ L’ have the connotation of ‘high’ and ‘low’ cost respectively. We shall
denote by ∆c,t h ec o s td i ﬀerence cH − cL. The prior belief that the type is eﬃcient, i.e.
c = cL,i sg i v e nb yν ∈ [0,1].
All players, the consumers, politician and the public agent, are risk neutral.
The politician levies non-distortionary taxes on the consumers to ﬁnance the payment
of a lumpsum transfer ‘t’a n dt h ec o s to fp r o v i s i o nC (q) to the public-agent. The politi-
cian announces the type contingent contracts (tL,q L,c L), (tH,q H,c H) respectively for the
eﬃcient and the ineﬃcient types of the public-agent. Each of these contracts speciﬁes a
triple: a transfer ti,aq u a n t i t yqi and an oﬃcial per unit price ci
6; i = H,L.
2.1. Bribes
If a type-cj public-agent (j = i or j 6= i) accepts the contract (ti,q i,c i), the bribe to the
public-agent j is
Bi = Bi(ti,q i,c i)=qi [p(qi) − ci] ; i = H,L. (2.1)
Note that the bribe received by type-cj depends on the contracted output, qi,t h e
consumer’s willingness to pay, p(qi),a n dt h eo ﬃcial price, ci.I np a r t i c u l a r ,t h eb r i b ed o e s
n o td e p e n do nt h eu n i tc o s t ,cj,o fa g e n tj. Sometimes we will simply use the abbreviated
notation Bi(qi) for Bi(ti,q i,c i). Figure 2.1 shows a situation in which the eﬃcient type,
type cL, accepts the contract designed for type cH.
The eﬃcient type is then faced with an oﬃcial price per unit, cH, but the consumers’
willingness to pay per unit is pH and so type cL receives a bribe BH = qH(pH −cH) (which
is independent of cL). Furthermore, by mis-stating costs type cL derives an extra payoﬀ
equal to ∆cqH because her per unit costs are cL but she is reimbursed at the rate of cH
per unit by the politician.
6Shleifer and Vishny (1993) also set the oﬃcial price equal to ci. This is not restrictive in the current
context as the level of the oﬃcial price has no bearing on the qualitative results provided that the oﬃcial
price is set no lower than the cost and no higher than the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay.
6Figure 2.1: Bribes And Cheating On Costs
Also note that bribes, under contract (ti,q i,c i), are positive if, and only if, contracted
output, qi,i sb e l o wt h eﬁrst best, qFB
i ,g i v e nb yp(qFB
i )=ci,s ot h a tp(qi) >c i. Hence, a
dishonest politican has an incentive to generate shortages to create the scope for bribes.
Bribes, deﬁned in (2.1), are equivalent to the monopoly proﬁts ΠM(qi) of a private
unregulated monopolist who has marginal cost ci.I t i s w e l l k n o w n t h a t i f ΠM(qi) is
concave then it has a unique maximum at qi = qM
i .F u r t h e r m o r e ,ΠM(qi) is increasing in
qi upto qi = qM
i and decreasing thereafter. This analogy can be used to infer the properties
of the bribe function Bi (qi).
Remark 1 :I fBi (q) is concave in q then bribes are increasing in contracted output for
all q<q M
i and decreasing in output for all q>q M








2.2. Sequence of moves in the static game
The sequence of moves in the static game (the dynamic game is considered in Section 5)
is as follows.
The politician announces the type contingent contracts (tL,q L,c L), (tH,q H,c H).T h e
public-agent accepts or rejects the contracts. If the contracts are accepted, the public-
agent decides whether to receive bribes from consumers. Then the politician discovers
hard evidence of bribes with probability ρ>0. With probability 1 − ρ, the public-agent
gets to keep the bribe. There are no penalties over and above the conﬁs c a t i o no ft h eb r i b e .
Such penalties do not qualitatively alter the results as long as they are not prohibitive
in the sense that they completely eliminate the incentive for bribery. This conforms to
7Figure 2.2: SEQUENCE OF MOVES IN THE STATIC GAME
the experience in many countries, notably several developing countries; for instance Rose-
Ackerman (1999).
If hard evidence is discovered, then the politician might (depending on the degree of
venality) oﬀer to suppress the evidence if the public-agent agrees to share the bribe; such
sharing uses the Nash Bargaining solution. If the public-agent refuses to share the bribe,
then the bribe is conﬁscated and returned back to the consumers. If the public-agent
agrees to share the bribe then the game ends with the division of the bribe and no bribes
are returned back to consumers. The solution is derived by backward induction.
2.3. Audits and information revelation
In our model, a successful audit merely reveals that a bribe has been paid (and its mag-
nitude). In particular, even a successful audit does not reveal any new information about
the cost parameter ci. From (2.1) it is immediately apparent that bribes only depend on
the type of the contract accepted by the public agent and not on the public-agent’s type.
We explain this more fully below.
In a fully separating equilibrium, type i (with marginal cost ci)c h o o s e sc o n t r a c t
8(ti,q i,c i) and hence, obviously, reveals the type through her choice of contract7.
At the other extreme, in a fully pooling equilibrium, where, say, both types cL and cH
choose contract (tH,q H,c H), auditing does not reveal any information about costs. The
audit merely reveals, with probability ρ,t h a tab r i b eqH [p(qH) − cH] has been paid. This
gives no new information about the true value of ci.
In a hybrid equilibrium where, say, type cH chooses contract (tH,q H,c H) with certainty
and type cL chooses (tL,q L,c L) with probability π>0, the politician updates her belief,
Prob(c = cL), from ν1 to ν2 (see section 5). If contract (tL,q L,c L) is chosen, then ν2 =1 .
A successful audit will reveal the bribe qL[p(qL) − cL] indicating that c = cL.B u tt h i si s
already known from the fact that the agent has accepted the contract (tL,q L,c L).O nt h e
other hand, if contract (tH,q H,c H) is accepted, then ν2 =
(1−π)ν1
(1−π)ν1+1−ν1. A successful audit
would reveal a bribe of qH [p(qH) − cH] conﬁrming that ν2 =
(1−π)ν1
(1−π)ν1+1−ν1, but adding no
new information.
In an extended model we could allow ‘cost auditing’ as well as ‘honesty auditing’. But
this lies beyond the scope of this paper.
2.4. Preferences of the Public-Agent
The expected utility of the public-agent of type cj who accepts the contract (ti,q i,c i),
E[Vj (ti,q i,c i)], j,i = H,L is deﬁned as






+( ci − cj)qi; j = io rj6= i (2.2)





is the expected bribe re-
ceived and the term (ci − cj)qi arises because a type j has unit cost cj but is reimbursed ci
by accepting the contract (ti,q i,c i) (see Figure 2.1). The expectation operator E runs over
the ‘state of the world’- absence or presence of hard evidence of bribes and the type of the
politician- venal or decent (these terms are formally deﬁned below). The public-agent’s
reservation utility is normalized to zero.
2.5. Preferences of Consumers
The expected utility of a representative consumer is deﬁned as
7Once the choice of contracts reveals the type of the public-agent, why does not the politician tear
up the origial contract and oﬀer the full information contracts? There are two reasons why this does
not happen. First, the ability of the government to commit not to renegotiate its contracts underpins a
large literature that uses mechanism design in the presence of asymmetric information. We ﬁnd this to
be a fairly plausible restriction given issues of reputation etc. Second, renegotiation might actually not
be possible in several kinds of static games when previous events are irreversible; see for instance Laﬀont
and Tirole (1993). Renegotiation is explicitly considered below in a dynamic version of the game.






; i = H,L (2.3)
where S (qi)=
R qi
0 p(q)dq is the ‘gross consumer surplus’. Consumers pay taxes of an
amount ti+ciqi to ﬁnance the operation of the public-agent and bribes equal to Bi to gain
access to the (possibly scarce) public output. In the event that hard evidence of bribes
is discovered by the politician and if the bribe is conﬁscated (which is an endogenous






receipt of such bribes by the consumers from the politician when a public agent chooses
contract (ti,q i,c i).
2.6. Preferences of the Politician














expected bribe received by the politician from the public-agent when the latter chooses
contract (ti,q i,c i). The parameter µ ∈ [0,∞) is the weight placed by the politician on
personal gratiﬁcation relative to social welfare; it reﬂects the “degree of the politician’s
venality”.
Deﬁnition 1 : A “venal” politician cares relatively more for personal beneﬁts i.e. µ>1
while a “decent” politician cares relatively more for social welfare i.e. µ ≤ 1.T h e“ d e g r e e
of venality” is given by the size of µ.
2.7. The Nash Bargaining Solution
Suppose that the politician discovers hard evidence of bribes after the public agent chooses
contract (ti,q i,c i).L e tx ∈ [0,B i] be the politician’s share of the bribe. If the politician
and the public agent reach an agreement on sharing the bribe, their respective payoﬀsa r e
W = S (qi) − (ti + ciqi) − Bi + µx,
Vj = ti + Bi − x +( ci − cj)qi; j = io rj6= i.
However, should the politician and the public-agent not be able to reach an agreement,
their respective disagreement payoﬀs, dP and dA,a r e
d
P = S (qi) − (ti + ciqi),
10d
A
j = ti +( ci − cj)qi.








= xi (µ − 1),w h i c h
is positive only when the politician is venal i.e. µ>1. The Nash Bargaining solution, xi,






,h e n c e
xi ∈ argmax (µx − Bi)(Bi − x)







and the public-agent’s share Bi − xi equals






Lemma 1 : In the event that hard evidence of bribes is found, a decent politician (µ ≤ 1)
returns all bribes to the consumers, while a venal politician (µ>1) conceals the evidence
for a share in the bribe. Furthermore, the politician’s share of the bribe is decreasing in
the degree of venality, µ,w i t hxN → Bi as µ → 1 and xi → Bi/2 as µ →∞ .
In Lemma 1 the decent politician’s decision to eschew a corrupt deal with the public-
agent is an endogenous one. It is harder to bribe a less venal politician, hence, the politi-
cian’s share of bribes is decreasing in the degree of venality.
2.8. The Public-agent’s Bribery Decision
When the politician is decent (µ ≤ 1), she conﬁscates the public-agent’s bribe. In this
case the public agent’s expected bribe, E
£
BA¤







=( 1− ρ)Bi. (2.7)
When the politician is venal (µ>1), given (2.6), the expected bribe of a public-agent,























Deﬁnition 2 : From (2.7) and (2.8), the generic expression for the public-agent’s ex-





= Φ(µ,ρ)Bi.W h e n
the politician is decent Φ(µ,ρ)=( 1− ρ) ≥ 0. When the politician is venal, Φ(µ,ρ)=
1 −
ρ
2 (1 + µ−1) ≥ 0.
11From Deﬁnition 2, Φ(µ,ρ) ≥ 0, hence, in the absence of any additional penalties above
the conﬁscation of the bribe, the public-agent always accepts bribes8.
3. The Full Information equilibrium
Under full information, the public-agent cannot misrepresent her type. Denote the equi-









j = D,V indexes the type of the politician; decent and venal respectively and i = H,L
refers to the public-agent’s type.
3.1. The Generic Problem






















j = D,V (3.1)
Subject to :






≥ 0 (Individual Rationality Constraint)
p(qi) ≥ ci (Feasibility Constraint)
The feasibility constraint ensures that the public-agent does not make any per-unit
losses, it is omitted for the time being but the solution is subsequently checked against
it. The individual rationality constraint, which ensures that the public-agent receives at
least the reservation utility, binds under full information, because rents to the public-agent





.N o t i c et h a t
the term (ci − cj)qi does not appear in the individual rationality constraint because types
cannot be misrepresented under full information.
8If ﬁnes are high enough then the decent (and perhaps some forms of venal politicians) can also stamp
out corruption. We are sceptical about raising ﬁnes for corruption to an appreciable degree, for the
following reasons. First, it is a legal requirement that comparable oﬀences for fraud be punished in a
comparable manner. Indeed, for comparable cases of fraud, for instance, tax evasion, the ﬁne is only
about 0.5 of the evaded tax payment. Second, legal practice in very concerned with Type I and Type II
errors. High ﬁnes might make legal mistakes unacceptably expensive. Third, high ﬁn ea r em o r ed i ﬃcult to
collect and involve complex complementary legal positions on bankruptcy law. Fourth, agent’s behaviour
might be distorted in important ways that are not modelled in this paper. Fifth, if the politician is venal
then high ﬁnes will raise his bargaining power. Hence, we are reluctant to push the case for high ﬁnes.
123.2. Decent Politician (µ ≤ 1)
With probability ρ the politician discovers hard evidence of the bribe and returns the bribe










=0while Φ(µ,ρ)=1−ρ (from (2.7)), hence,
the generic problem in subsection 3.1 reduces to the following unconstrained problem.
q
D∗
i ∈ argmax W
D = S (qi) − cqi




It is obvious that the solution is ﬁrst best, qD∗
i = qFB
i , and the feasibility constraint is
satisﬁed. The intuition is that with probability ρ the bribe gets conﬁscated and returned
back to consumers while with probability 1 − ρ, transfers to the public-agent are reduced
by the amount of the bribe so net bribes paid equal Bi − Bi[ρ +( 1− ρ)] = 0.T h er e s u l t
is recorded without proof in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 : The corruptibility of the public-agent is irrelevant under the regime of
a decent politician and the outcome is ﬁrst best.
Proposition 1 shows that relative to the corruptibility of a public-agent, the corrupt-
ibility of the politician is of ﬁrst order importance. Under full information, bribery never
occurs if the politician is decent. This contrasts with Shleifer and Vishny (1993) where
bribery can occur even when the politician is decent, because output is not contractible.
3.3. Venal Politician (µ>1)





=0 .S i n c e











BiΦ(µ,ρ) where Φ(µ,ρ) is given in (2.8). Hence, the generic problem in section 3.1 can
be written as the following unconstrained problem:
q
V ∗
i ∈ argmax W
V (qi,c i)=S(qi) − ciqi − ξB(qi,c i) (3.3)




(1 + µ)(1− µ) < 0. (3.4)





























which holds if ∂2B
∂q2
i ≤ 0. Substituting
∂Bi




















;i = H,L (3.7)
Proposition 2 : The contracted output is intermediate between the ﬁrst best and the
monopoly level i.e. qM
i <q V ∗
i <q FB






> 0. The contracted output is decreasing and bribes are increasing in (1) the
politician’s degree of venality, µ,a n d( 2 )e ﬃciency of the monitoring technology, ρ.
Proposition 2 shows that corruption takes the form of shortages of public output relative
to the ﬁrst best, however, the contracted output exceeds that produced by a private
unregulated monopolist. Some well known examples of shortages include the former Soviet
Union (Shleifer and Vishny (1992)), the recent experience of transition economies (Levine
and Satarov (2000), UNDP (1997)), and the “License Raj” in India (Bardhan (1984)).
More venal politicians (high µ) contract lower output because that is the direction of
increasing bribes when qM
i <q V ∗
i (see Remark 1), hence, shortages worsen under their
regime. This result can change under asymmetric information, as will be shown in section
4b e l o w .Am o r ee ﬃcient auditing technology (high ρ) decreases ξ, the venal politician’s
private marginal cost of a unit of bribes, hence, creating greater shortages and bribes.
Under full information, transfers are negative in the regime of a venal politician because
ti = −Φ(µ,ρ)Bi ≤ 0. One interpretation of negative transfers is the sale of public oﬃces,
for instance, ‘tax farming’. Another interpretation is more natural in corrupt regimes,
competition for government jobs by paying up-front bribes (negative transfers) is pervasive
in several countries; see for instance Krueger (1974) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
4. Equilibrium Under Asymmetric Information
The full information allocation is not incentive compatible under asymmetric information.
Denote the contracts designed for the eﬃcient and the ineﬃcient types respectively by
(qL,t L) and (qH,t H)9. Dropping superscripts, the eﬃcient type’s expected payoﬀ from
accepting her full information contract is EVL(qL,t L)=0 , but, under asymmetric infor-
mation on the public-agent’s type, by accepting the ineﬃcient type’s contract, its expected
payoﬀ is EVL(qH,t H)=tH+Φ(µ,ρ)BH+∆cqH,w h e r e∆c = cH−cL > 0. On substitution
9The actual contracts are (qL,t L,c L) and (qH,t H,c H). However, since the oﬃcial price always equal
the corresponding marginal cost, these contracts are used in an abbreviated form as (qL,t L) and (qH,t H)
14of tH = −Φ(µ,ρ)BH,c h e c kt h a tEVL(qH;cL)=∆cq H > 0. Hence, the eﬃcient type has
an incentive to misrepresent her type.
4.1. The Generic Problem
The politician chooses type contingent contracts to maximize expected welfare Zj,w h e r e
Z
j = νW
j (qL,t L)+( 1− ν)W
j (qH,t H) ; j = D,V (4.1)
subject to the following four constraints
EVH (qH,t H)=tH + Φ(µ,ρ)BH ≥ 0 (IRH)
EVL(qL,t L)=tL + Φ(µ,ρ)BL ≥ 0 (IRL)
EVH (qH,t H) ≥ EVH (qL,t L) ⇔ tH + Φ(µ,ρ)BH ≥ tL + Φ(µ,ρ)BL − ∆cqL (ICH)
EVL (qL,t L) ≥ EVL (qH,t H) ⇔ tL + Φ(µ,ρ)BL ≥ tH + Φ(µ,ρ)BH + ∆cqH (ICL)
where W j is deﬁned in (3.1). The ‘individual rationality’ constraints IRH and IRL
ensure that each of the types gets at least its reservation utility, while the ‘incentive
compatibility constraints’ ICH and ICL ensure that none of the types chooses the contract
intended for the other type. The solution to this problem is well known10.E s s e n t i a l l y ,
ICL and IRH bind and their satisfaction ensures satisfaction of IRL.T h ec o n s t r a i n tICH
is ignored for the time being; it can be checked later that it holds. From the binding IRH
constraint, one obtains
tH = −Φ(µ,ρ)BH. (4.2)
Substituting tH into the binding ICL constraint, the latter can be rewritten as
tL = −Φ(µ,ρ)BL + qH∆c (4.3)
Deﬁnition 3 : The information rent of the eﬃcient public-agent, type-cL,e q u a l sqH∆c>
0.
10See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990a) or Laﬀont and Tirole (1993).
15Furthermore, by adding the two IC constraints one gets ∆c(qL − qH) ≥ 0 which implies
that qL ≥ qH i.e. incentive compatibility requires that the contracted output of the eﬃcient
type is higher. Substituting tH and tL from (4.2) and (4.3) into the objective function,




















































H can be found as residuals






With probability ρ the politician discovers hard evidence of the bribe and returns the









= Φ(µ,ρ)B ≥ 0 where










D = ν [S (qL) − cLqL]+( 1− ν)[S (qH) − cHqH] − νqH∆c
From the ﬁrst order conditions, the optimal contracted output for types cL and cH


















Since (4.5) is identical to (3.2) so qD
L = qD∗
L = qFB
L , thus, the decent politician always
requires the eﬃcient type to produce the ﬁrst best output11. However, (4.6) and (3.2) are
not identical and so in general qD
H 6= qD∗
H .




We will denote η as the elasticity of demand for the public output evaluated at qM
H ,
where as before, qM
H is the output produced by a private unregulated monopolist.
11It is easy to check that the omitted ICH constriant is satisﬁed by the solution. Substituting (4.2) and
(4.3) into the ICH constraint one gets ∆c(qH − qL) ≤ 0, which is true because qH ≤ qL.





H .F u r t h e r m o r e ,qD
H is lower (greater) than qM
H as the “expected information rent
per unit of revenue” is greater (lower) than the inverse of the elasticity of demand. If
qD
H <q M
H bribes are increasing in qD
H while if qD
H >q M
H bribes are decreasing in qD
H.
If expected information rents per unit of revenue are high enough then the politician
creates shortages to limit information rents of the eﬃcient type. The relevant comparison
of information rents is with the inverse of the elasticity of demand. The intuition is that
if elasticity is higher then the sacriﬁce in consumer surplus associated with shortages is
lower. Under asymmetric information, even a decent politician might contract an output
that is lower relative to the optimal output produced by an unregulated private monopolist
i.e. it is possible that qD
H <q M
H . Recall that under full information (see section 3) even the




Although there is no distortion of output for an eﬃcient public-agent in equilibrium,
nevertheless, the eﬃcient type is paid a “honesty allowance” or “information rent” in re-
turn for her honesty. Bardhan (1997) provides several examples of the empirical relevance
of this result. Historically, imperial China used the policy of paying an extra allowance
called the “yang-lien yin” (money to nourish honesty) to district magistrates. Robert
Clive used a similar policy to reduce corruption in the East India Company. Hong-Kong
and Singapore have successfully used incentive payments to reduce corruption; see for in-
stance Klitgaard (1988) and Rose-Ackerman (1999). Although, incentive payments accord
more naturally with an agency theoretic explanation, for instance Rose-Ackerman (1999),
Mookherji (1997), Mookherji and Png (1995), Besley and McLaren (1993) and Klitgaard
(1988), the essence of the result is unchanged in an adverse selection model.
Proposition 4 : Shortages in contracted output worsen as (1) ∆c increases, and (2)
ν increases. However, the aﬀect on the magnitude of bribes in equilibrium depends on
whether qD
H ≷ qM
H ; increasing when qD
H >q M
H and decreasing when qD
H <q M
H .
An increase in ∆c or in ν increases expected information rents, which the politician
attempts to reduce by creating shortages. Since the aﬀe c to nt h em a g n i t u d eo fb r i b e s
depends on whether the contracted output qD
H ≷ qM
H , these results illustrate an impor-
tant trade-oﬀ faced by anti-corruption programmes, namely, a possible conﬂict between











= ρxi and E
£
BA¤
= BΦ(µ,ρ) where Φ(µ,ρ)=1−
ρ
2 (1 + µ−1) (from equa-
17tion (2.8)); substituting in (4.4), the venal politician’s unconstrained problem is to choose
(qL,q H) to maximize the following expression
Z
V = ν [S (qL) − cLqL − ξBL]+( 1− ν)[S (qH) − cHqH − ξBH] − νqH∆c (4.7)
As deﬁn e di n( 3 . 4 ) ,ξ =
ρ
2µ (1 + µ)(1− µ) < 0, is the venal politician’s private marginal
cost of a unit of bribes. From the ﬁrst order conditions, the optimal contracted output for






































(1 − ν)(1− ξ)
(4.9)
Comparing (3.7) with (4.8) and (4.9) it follows that qV
L = qV ∗
L ,h o w e v e r ,qV
H 6= qV ∗
H .
The comparative static properties for a venal politician under full information, stated in
Proposition 2, continue to hold for qV
L but those for qV
H are aﬀected by the presence of the
last term in (4.9). The discussion below is organized under three heads.
4.3.1. Shortages and Bribes
Under full information, when the politician is decent, higher-order corruption, in the termi-
nology of Rose-Ackerman (1999) is more crucial, lower-order corruption becomes irrelevant
in such a setting (see Proposition 1). However, under asymmetric information, lower-order
corruption is relevant, as shown below in Lemma 2
Lemma 2 : The venal politician contracts qV
H <q V ∗
H and there are positive bribes in
equilibrium. qV
H is greater (lower) than qM
H as the “price markup per unit of revenue” is
greater (lower) than the “expected information rent per unit of revenue”. Shortages in




Under asymmetric information, an increase in either ν or in ∆c increases expected in-
formation rents. The venal politician responds, just as the decent politician, by contract-
ing the ineﬃcient type to supply an even lower quantity. The eﬀect on bribes, however,
depends on whether the contracted output is below (in which case bribes decrease) or
above (in which case bribes increase) the monopoly level. If qV
H >q M
H then an increase
in contracted output towards the ﬁrst best is also accompanied by a reduction in bribes.
However, when qV
H <q M
H a reduction in bribery is accompanied by a movement in output
away from the ﬁrst best; clearly in this case, there is trade-oﬀ in reducing bribery.
18The tradeoﬀ between bribery and shortages raises interesting welfare issues. For in-
stance it is likely, depending on the parameter values, that an increase in welfare aris-
ing from a reduction in bribes overweighs the decrease in welfare arising from increased
shortages. Some positive level of corruption can then be welfare enhancing. The existing
literature typically ignores the tradeoﬀ between production eﬃciency and bribery.
Under full information, the venal politician creates greater scarcities and bribes relative
to the decent politician and the contracted output, q∗
H, always lies below that produced
by a private unregulated monopolist, qM




H , j = D,H. Furthermore, bribes are increasing in contracted
output upto qM
H and decreasing in contracted output thereafter. Since, the venal politician
cares about bribes, in addition to limiting information rents, while the decent politician
only cares about the latter, the relative contracted output under each of these types of
politicians depends on which side of qM
H the originally contracted output lies on. This is
formally shown in Lemma 3 below.
Lemma 3 : When the contracted output lies above qM
H ,t h e nqV
H <q D
H.H o w e v e r ,w h e n
the contracted output lies below qM
H ,t h e nqD
H <q V
H.
Lemma 3 shows that, unlike the full information case, the venal politician does not
necessarily create greater shortages relative to the decent politician. Many forms of public
output where scarcity rents have been documented, form an important prerequisite for pri-
vate investment/ activity in the economy; these include, for instance, industrial licenses,
export-import licenses and public credit. Thus, it is plausible to conjecture that scarci-
ties, relative to the ﬁrst best output, can potentially reduce private investment and by
implication, growth; see for instance Mauro (1995, 1997). The implication of Lemma 3 in
this context is that investment and growth might be greater under the regime of a decent
politician when output is high (qM
H <q H), however, at low levels of output (qM
H >q H), it
might be higher in the regime of a venal politician.
4.3.2. Auditing Technology
Venal Politician: Several widely advocated anti-corruption measures, documented
for instance in Rose-Ackerman (1999), recommend an improvement in the auditing tech-
nology in order to reduce the incidence of corruption. However, when the politician is
venal, the model predicts that this policy recommendation will be unsuccessful in reduc-
ing bribes. Furthermore, there are important, and hitherto unrecognized, implications for
production eﬃciency; these issues are formalized in Proposition 5.





∂ρ > 0 and
∂B(qV
H)
∂ρ > 0.H o w e v e r , i f qM
H <q V
H,t h e n
∂qH




19An increase in ρ enables the venal politician to detect hard information about bribes
more often. Hence, if the venal politician were to distort output to increase bribes, her
expected bribes would increase. This increase in the marginal beneﬁt of creating bribes
(by distorting the contracted output) over the marginal cost (the distortion in consumer
surplus) results in greater output distortions and bribes in equilibrium. Using Remark
1 it is obvious that the equilibrium contracted output moves towards the unregulated
monopoly output, qM
H , from both directions; this essentially is the result in Proposition 5.
Although, an improvement in the monitoring technology always leads to an increase
in bribes, however, when qV
H <q M
H (through an increase in contracted output) it enhances
allocative eﬃciency, while if qV
H >q M
H it (through a decrease in contracted output) reduces
allocative eﬃciency. Hence, at high output levels an improvement in monitoring technology
is unambiguously bad if the politician is venal, while at lower output levels (qV
H <q M
H )i t
can be welfare enhancing.
Decent Politician: Recall from (4.5) and (4.6) that the ﬁrst order conditions for a
decent politician are independent of ρ and, hence, the contracted output in this case is
independent of an improvement in the monitoring technology. This result can change if
taxes are distortionary or there are secrecy costs involved in exchanging bribes.
Consider, for instance, that there are distortionary costs of taxation so that in order
to raise a unit of tax revenues, one needs to raise 1+τ units of tax revenue (τ being


















Implicitly diﬀerentiating (4.10) it can be checked that sign of
∂qD
H




The intuition hinges on the choice between two alternative sources of paying the public
agent: directly by raising distortionary taxes or indirectly through bribes, so that her indi-
vidual rationality constraint is satisﬁed. The marginal beneﬁt of creating bribes (through
output distortions) is high if ρ is low so that the expected bribe received by the public-
agent, E[BA
i ], is high and, therefore, a greater amount of distortionary taxes are oﬀset.
Hence, if ρ is high the marginal beneﬁt of creating bribes is low and output then is distorted
towards lower bribes. Using Remark 1, this direction is away from qM
H in both directions;
this is what is implied by sign of
∂qD
H




Exactly the same calculation would then apply to the case of a venal politican. How-
ever, Proposition 5 would continue to illustrate the additional inﬂuence on contracted
output when the politician is venal; one would merely be using a new benchmark to
20compare the two kinds of politicians. For this reason, we omit further discussion of the
distortionary taxation case.
Relation to the literature: The bribe increasing aspect of better auditing technol-
ogy is similar to Proposition 1 in Laﬀont and Guessan (1999) who interpret an increase
in ρ as an increase in “competitiveness”. The interpretation of ρ as competitiveness is
best seen by imagining that the responsibility for monitoring the public-agent rests with
some auditing supervisors and a proportion ρ are honest. However, unlike Laﬀont and
Guessan (1999), the intuition here is that when the politician is corrupt, then an increase
in ρ reduces the private marginal cost of bribes to the venal politician.
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) show empirically that greater distortions, relative to the
ﬁrst best, are associated with weaker auditing technologies (low ρ). However, in Acemoglu
and Verdier (2000) the number of public-agents employed by the government (which cor-
responds to the contracted output) increases following a decrease in ρ.P r o p o s i t i o n 5 i s
able to reconcile these conﬂicting results; at low levels of output (qH <q M
H )o n eg e t st h e
Tanzi-Davoodi result while at higher levels of output (qH >q M
H ) one gets the Acemoglu-
Verdier result. The tradeoﬀ between production eﬃciency and bribery is again central to
this explanation.
4.3.3. Degree of Politician’s Venality
Under full information, if the politician is venal, the contracted output is decreasing and
bribes are increasing in the degree of venality (or corruptibility) of the politician, µ (see
Proposition 2). This section extends that result to asymmetric information.





∂µ > 0 and
∂BH(qV
H)
∂µ > 0. However, if qM
H <q V
H,t h e n
∂qH




Proposition 6 shows that the full information result survives if qM
H <q V
H.I n t h e
complementary case (qV
H <q M
H ), bribes (and contracted output) are increasing in µ.T h e
tradeoﬀ between allocative eﬃciency and bribes creates similar welfare issues to those
discussed following Proposition 5.
5. The Dynamic Game (Venal Politician)
Suppose now that the politician can oﬀer the public-agent a long-term contract that lasts
for two periods. Long-term contracts are generally not renegotiation proof. For instance,

















repeated over the two periods are not renegotiation-proof because the choice of the ﬁrst
21period contract reveals the type of the public-agent. To minimize notation we denote by
EVi the expected payoﬀ of a type ci, i = L,H, public-agent when she accepts the contract
(qi,t i). At the beginning of the second period, the politician can oﬀer to renegotiate the
contract of the ineﬃcient type by contracting it to produce the ﬁr s tb e s to u t p u tq
j∗
H,w h i l e
maintaining EVH =0 . In the second period, the eﬃcient type will be oﬀered a contract
that does not contain any information rents so, EVL =0 . Letting 0 <δbe the discount
factor, the intertemporal rent earned by the eﬃcient type is thus qH∆c +0∗ δ = qH∆c.
However, if the eﬃcient type pools with the ineﬃcient type, the politician does not update
beliefs and so, intertemporal rents equal qH∆c(1 + δ),a ni m p r o v e m e n to fδqH∆c over the
separating equilibrium. Hence, the static contracts are not-renegotiation-proof.
The decent politician is a simpler and special case of a venal politician, hence, the
discussion in this section focusses only on the latter.
5.1. Description of the Dynamic Game
Suppressing all superscripts and subscripts, write the contract (q,t) as t(q).T h e“ o ﬃcial
price” speciﬁed in the contract equals c and the feasibility constraint requires p(q) ≥ c.
The timing of the contracts is summarized in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Basic Represenation Of The Dynamic Game
B a s e do nt h ep r i o rb e l i e f ,ν = ν1, that the public-agent is of type cL,t h ep o l i t i c i a n





where t1(q1) speciﬁes “ﬁrst period” transfers
conditional on the ﬁrst period contracted output q1 and tO
2 (q1,q 2) is the “null contract”
for the “second period”, conditional on the ﬁrst and the second period contracted outputs,
q1 and q2. Conditional on the contracts chosen in the ﬁrst period, the politician updates
her prior beliefs, using Bayes rule, at the end of the ﬁrst period, to ν = ν2. In the second
period, the politician can oﬀer a new, renegotiated, contract tR
2 (q1,q 2), to the public-
agent. However, given the long-term nature of the original contract, if the new contract is
rejected by the public-agent, the politician is committed to implementing the null contract
22tO
2 (q1,q 2). Since the politician and the public-agent are rational and forward looking, the
politician might as well oﬀer a renegotiation-proof contract in the ﬁrst period itself, in
anticipation of future renegotiation.
5.2. Characterization of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
Suppose that the second period rents promised to types cL and cH in the original long-term




H ; there is no
loss in generality by normalizing EV
jO
H =0 .
In designing the second period contract, conditional on the existence of the null con-
tract, the politician chooses (qL,t L,EV L) and (qH,t H,EV H) in order to maximize
Z
j(ν2)=ν2W
j (qL,t L)+( 1− ν2)W
j (qH,t H) (5.1)
subject to the following three constraints
EVH = tH + Φ(µ,ρ)BH ≥ V
O
H ≡ 0 (IRH)




where Zj is as deﬁned in (4.1). Denote the optimal renegotiation-proof contracts





















R signiﬁes renegotiation while j = D,V denotes the type of the politician. With the
exception of the third constraint, the second period optimization problem is identical to
the one considered in Section 4.1, except that the IRH constraint now requires that type
cH must not be given lower rents relative to those promised in the null contract. For the
renegotiated contract to be attractive to the eﬃcient type, its rents should be no lower
relative to those in the null contract; this constitutes the renegotiation-proof constraint,
denoted by RP. As in Section 4, the ICH constraint is omitted for the time being; it is
easy to check ex-post that it is not violated by the solution.










Check that tH enters negatively in the objective function, so the IRH constraint binds,
thus EV O
H = EV R
H =0 . Substituting tH = −Φ(µ,ρ)BH from IRH into ICL,o n ec a n
rewrite the latter as EVL = tL + Φ(µ,ρ)BL ≥ qH∆c. Unlike in Section 4, there is no
guarantee that the ICL constraint will bind because of the presence of the RP constraint.
23Substituting tH = −Φ(µ,ρ)BH into the objective function, and letting κ1 and κ2 be the
Lagrangian multipliers on the ICL and the RP constraints, one gets the the following
generic problem.
The politician chooses tL, qL, qH and EVL to maximize the Lagrangian expression:
Λ = ν2
∙








+( 1− ν2)[S (qH) − cHqH − ξBH]







For a venal politician ξ =
ρ
2µ (1 + µ)(1− µ) < 0 and Φ(µ,ρ)=1−
ρ
2 (1 + µ−1) (these
are deﬁned in (3.4) and (2.8)). In the ﬁrst instance, diﬀerentiate (5.2) with respect to tL
and qL only; the ﬁrst order conditions are
∂Λ
∂tL


















Substitute κ1 = ν2 from (5.3) into (5.4) evaluated at the optimal renegotiation proof




















The ﬁrst order conditions (5.5), (4.8) and (3.7) are identical, hence, the contracted
output of the eﬃcient type is not distorted i.e. qVR
L = qV
L = qV ∗
L . Substituting qL = qVR
L =
qV
L and using the deﬁnition EVL = tL+Φ(µ,ρ)BL in (5.2), the problem reduces to ﬁnding

















+( 1− ν2)[S (qH) − cHqH − ξBH]
+( ϕ1 + ϕ2 − ν2)EVL − ϕ2EV
jO
L − ϕ1qH∆c
where ϕ1 and ϕ2 are respectively the Lagrangian multipliers on the ICL and the RP
constraints when qVR
L = qV
L.T h eﬁrst order conditions with respect to qH and EVL can be







(1 − ν2)(1− ξ)
(5.6)
ϕ1 + ϕ2 = ν2 ; ϕ1 ≥ 0, ϕ2 ≥ 0 (5.7)
24Since EV O
H = EV R
H =0as above, then using Deﬁnition 5, renegotiation-proofness of
the null contract is guaranteed if one can ﬁnd the conditions under which EV O
L = EV R
L ;
these conditions are stated in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 : The null contract is renegotiation-proof if qV
H (ν2)∆c ≤ EV O
L ≤ qV ∗
H ∆c.
where qV
H (ν2) is the optimal static contract under asymmetric information when ν = ν2.
5.3. The Optimal Renegotiation-Proof Long-Term Contract
Attention is restricted to a menu of two long-term contracts, X and Y ,o ﬀered by the
politician at the beginning of the game. The output contracted in contract k = X,Y
in time period t =1 ,2 is denoted by qk
t . The time discount factor is12 0 <δ .T y p e cL
plays a mixed strategy and accepts contract X with probability π and contract Y with
probability 1 − π while type cH accepts contract Y with probability equal to one13.T h e
basic structure of the long-term contract is described in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Description Of The Long Term Contract
Several elements of the optimal contract can be constructed by the following heuristic
arguments. Posterior beliefs are updated using Bayes rule. At the upper node, followed
12Since the two contiguous time periods are not necessarily of equal length, thus, there is no presumption
that δ is bounded above by 1.
13Restricting the number of contracts to equal the number of types, and allowing the eﬃcient type to
randomize, does not compromise on generality, see Laﬀont and Tirole (1993).
25by the ﬁrst period choice of qX
1 the type of the public-agent is revealed to be cL,h e n c e ,
posterior beliefs specify that ν2 =1and the second period choice of contracted output,
qX
2 , is thus optimally equal to the ﬁr s tb e s ti . e . qV ∗
L . At the lower node, followed by the
ﬁrst period choice of qY
1 , the posterior beliefs are given by ν2 =
(1−π)ν1
(1−π)ν1+(1−ν1 and following
this node, the intended contract for the eﬃcient type, denoted by qY
2 (cL),i st h eﬁrst best
contract qV ∗
L .
When type cL chooses contract Y then, in a renegotiation-proof contract, its total
intertemporal information rents equal qY
1 ∆c + δEV O
L .S i n c et y p ecL randomizes between
the two contracts, it must get identical rents from contract X. Furthermore, given that
type cL produces the ﬁrst best allocation in the second period of contract X and must be
oﬀered a ﬁx e da m o u n to fi n t e r t e m p o r a lr e n t s ,qY
1 ∆c+δEV O
L , it is also optimal to contract
the eﬃcient output in the ﬁrst period i.e. qX
1 = qV ∗
L . Fixing π for the time being (the
optimal π is found in section 5.4) the problem for the politician is to ﬁnd the following. (1)
Output allocations in contract Y ,i . e .qY
1 and qY
2H (henceforth, qY
2H, the quantity contracted
for type cH in the second period of contract Y ,i sd e n o t e ds i m p l yb yqY
2 because qY
2L = qV ∗
L ).
(2) Second period expected rent EV O
L (in the null contract) to oﬀer to type cL.F o r m a l l y ,
the politician chooses qY
1 , qY














































Subject to : q
Y





The RP constraint derives from Lemma 4 and ensures that the solution is renegotiation-
proof.
Lemma 5 : The optimal contracted output is qY
2 = qV
H (ν2) and the expected information





H (ν2) in the objective function, and collecting terms corresponding
to qY
1 , the optimal solution to qY
1 can be found by maximizing
L















The ﬁrst order condition with respect to qY






























26Denote the solution to qY
1 derived from (5.9) by
f
q1 (ν1). Proposition 7 compares
f
q1 (ν1) to
the solution in the static asymmetric information case, qV
H (ν1).
Proposition 7 : Relative to the output contracted for the ineﬃcient type in the static
contract, qV
H (ν1), the magnitude of shortages decreases in each period of the renegotiation-





H (ν1) ≤ qY
2 = qV
H (ν2).B r i b e sc a n
either increase or decrease depending on whether
f
q1 ≷ qM
H . Furthermore, the contracted
output
f
q1 is increasing in the probability π with which type cL chooses contract X.
The contracted output is increasing in π because it reduces the expected information
rents of the eﬃcient type, hence, reducing the need to create shortages in order to limit
such rents. One could compare the long-term contract analyzed above to a series of short-
term (one period) contracts oﬀered to a sequence of public-agents each of whom has private
information about costs. Proposition 7 provides some guidelines for such a choice in the
presence of corruption. The long-term contract unambiguously dominates the short-term
contract in terms of reducing the output distortion (
f
q1 is relatively closer to the ﬁrst best
as compared to qV




q1)o rh i g h e rb r i b e s( i f
f
q1 <q M
H ). In the former case, the long-term contract
is unambiguously better in terms of both production eﬃciency and bribes while in the
latter case, the choice between the two contracts depends on society’s preferences over
eﬃciency and bribery. It is entirely possible that the cost in terms of greater bribery is
found acceptable in return for the beneﬁts of enhanced production eﬃciency.
In the hybrid equilibrium above, 0 ≤ π ≤ 1; the two polar cases of the fully separating
equilibrium (π =1 ) and the fully pooling equilibrium (π =0 ) are considered below for
completeness.
5.3.1. Fully Separating Equilibrium




















(1 − ν1)(1− ξ)
∆c (5.10)
Comparing (5.10) and (4.9) it is obvious that qY
1 = qV
H (ν1).
5.3.2. Fully Pooling Equilibrium




































275.4. Determining the Optimal π
The optimal dynamic contracts have so far been worked out conditional on a given value
of π.T h i ss u b s e c t i o ne x a m i n e ss o m ep r o p e r t i e so ft h eo p t i m a lπ. Essentially, the politi-
cian substitutes the optimal contracts in (5.8) and since the lower limit of the associated











































H depend on π, and using the envelope theorem, the ﬁrst order























≤ 0;π ≥ 0
(5.12)



















∂π > 0, thus, a necessary condition for an interior
solution to π is that the term in the second braces in (5.12) be positive. Using this
information, it is straightforward to check, using the implicit function theorem that ∂π∗
∂δ < 0
i.e. the probability of separation of the eﬃcient type is decreasing in the discount factor
δ. Proposition 8 below describes how π∗ responds to δ ∈ (0,∞);r e c a l lt h a tt h el e n g t h so f
the two periods are not necessarily identical so that δ is not bounded above.
Proposition 8 :As u ﬃcient condition for the “fully pooling equilibrium” (π∗ =0 )t o
be optimal is that δ →∞ . There exists some critical δ = δC > 0 such that the “fully
separating equilibrium” (π∗ =1 )i so p t i m a lf o rδ ≤ δC. The hybrid equilibrium is optimal
for intermediate values of δ.
Since the public-agent of type cL is indiﬀerent between the two contracts X and Y ,
what assurance does one have that the public-agent will randomize according to π∗?A
simple interpretation is that when there are a large number of type cL public-agents, a
proportion π∗ are oﬀered the contract X and another proportion 1 − π∗ are oﬀered the
contract Y . A more detailed discussion of the issue using puriﬁcation theorems falls outside
the scope of the paper, see for instance Fudenberg and Tirole (1990).
6. Conclusions
This paper considers a hierarchical relation between a possibly venal politician and a pri-
vately informed public-agent contracted to supply output/ services on behalf of the former
28to ﬁnal consumers. The politician contracts the public-agent to supply a certain output at
an oﬃcial price, but the latter can choose to receive a bribe to clear the market i.e. charge
a price in excess of the oﬃcial price. The politician uses a monitoring technology that un-
earths the incidence of bribery with some positive probability. In the event that the bribe
is discovered, a venal politician is willing to hide evidence of the bribe if the public-agent
shares the bribes with her. The paper provides information-theoretic microfoundations to
this classical problem of scarcity rents. Furthermore, it generates a set of plausible and
potentially testable theoretical predictions.
In general, the equilibrium is characterized by shortages and bribes. The contracted
output can be smaller or greater relative to that produced by a private unregulated monop-
olist. The paper reconciles apparently conﬂicting results on the aﬀect of an improvement
in the auditing technology on the size of the public sector. An important insight of the
paper is that anti-corruption reforms, such as an improvement in the auditing technology,
face important trade-oﬀs in enhancing allocative eﬃciency on the one hand and changes
in equilibrium bribes on the other. The size of the public sector can be symptomatic of
alternative degrees of corruption. Relative to the static case, in the dynamic renegotiation-
proof equilibrium, shortages fall but bribes can either increase or decrease. This suggests
important determinants of the choice between oﬀering short-term and long-term contracts
to public-agents.
Future research can incorporate political institutions and electoral procedures. Politi-
cal competition among parties could possibly oﬀset some of output distortion that arises
on account of corruption. For instance, a party might contest the election on the platform
that its candidates have a relatively lower degree of venality, µ, as compared to the oppo-
sition. A plausible model along these lines would have to consider a host of contractibility,
credibility and coordination issues. Other interesting extensions of the model would be to
examine the relationship between corruption and growth, to consider a judicial system that
could possibly punish corrupt politicians, and lobbying by consumer groups to inﬂuence
the contracted output by directly engaging in side transactions with the politician.
7. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 : Check that the net surplus from Nash bargaining, W+Vj− dP−dA
j ,
equals x(µ − 1). If the politician is decent (µ ≤ 1) then the net surplus is non-
positive so there are no gains from the corrupt transaction between the politician
and the public-agent. Thus, decent politicians (endogenously) refrain from such
corrupt deals. Clearly, for a venal politician (µ>1) there is net positive surplus to
be shared between the two parties. Using (2.5) check that (1)
∂xi
∂µ = −Bi/2µ2 ≤ 0,
hence, the venal politician’s share of the bribe is decreasing in the degree of venality,
29and (2) in the limit xi → Bi as µ → 1 and xi → Bi/2 as µ →∞ . ¥
Proof of Proposition 2 :S i n c eξ<0 it follows from (3.7) that p(qV ∗


















i > 0. Recall from Remark 1 that




∂qi =0 . Using this in conjunction with the ﬁrst order condition






∂qi . Given that the
second order condition requires concavity of the bribe function (and by implication
that of ΠM) it follows that qM <q V ∗
i .













2 > 0 (7.1)


















(1 − µ) < 0 (7.3)
Using (7.2) and (7.3) in conjunction with (7.1) implies that ∂q∗




∂q < 0 from (3.7), the claims on the magnitude of bribes follow by using
Remark 1. ¥






H ), and since p0 < 0,
therefore, qD
H <q D∗
H . The problem of a private unregulated monopolist is to maximize
ΠM(qH)=qH {p(qH) − cH} and the solution qM
H satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
p(q
M
















η.S i n c e






η. The last part of the Proposition, on the magnitude of
bribes, follows by using Remark 1 and noting that ΠM(qH) is concave with an optimizing
choice given by qM
H . ¥
Proof of Proposition 4 : The proof follows by using p0 < 0 and implicitly diﬀerentiating
(4.6) with respect to ∆c and ν.T h ee ﬀect on bribes uses Remark 1, the concavity
of ΠM(qH) and the fact that qM
H is the optimizing choice. ¥















The feasibility condition requires p(qV




















∂qH =0it follows that qV
H is greater (lower) than qM















, as claimed. Implicitly diﬀerentiating (4.9) with respect to ∆c and ν,
check that qV
H is decreasing in each argument. The aﬀect on bribes follows from Remark
1, the concavity of B ≡ ΠM and the fact that qM
H is the optimizing choice. ¥


























































































∂qH < 0. ¥












ξ ≤ 0. (7.7)

























































For a venal politician, µ>1 and ξ<0, hence, the sign of
∂qV
H









∂qH > 0 and so,
∂qH





∂qH < 0 and so
∂qH
∂ρ < 0. ¥





























































For a venal politician ξ<0, hence, the sign of
∂qV
H









∂qH > 0 and so,
∂qH





∂qH < 0 and
so
∂qH
∂µ < 0. ¥
Proof of Lemma 4 : Renegotiation-proofness requires that EV O
L = EV R
L ,s ot h en u l l
contract will not be renegotiation-proof when the RP constraint (see section 5.2)
does not bind.
[Case-I] RP constraint does not bind
In this case EV O
L <E V R
L and the null contract is not renegotiation-proof. Since the
RP constraint does not bind, the complementary slackness condition implies that ϕ2 =0 ,






















(1 − ν2)(1− ξ)
(7.12)
The ﬁrst order condition (7.12) is identical to (4.9), hence, qVR
H = qV
H (ν2) but with prior
beliefs replaced by the updated beliefs. If the ﬁrst constraint (the ICL constraint) binds,







= qH∆c.I fi td o e sn o tb i n dt h e nϕ1 =0
and since ϕ2 =0 , using (5.7) one gets ν2 =0 .B u t ν2 > 0, hence, ruling out this case.
From the discussion above, in Case-I, the status of the two constraints is EV O




H (ν2)∆c respectively. So, the null contract is not renegotiation-proof if
EV O
L <q V
H (ν2)∆c, therefore, a necessary condition for renegotiation-proofness is that
qV
H (ν2)∆c ≤ EV O
L .
[Case-II] RP constraint binds
When the RP constraint binds i.e. EV O
L = EV R
L , then the original contract is
renegotiation-proof and the complementary slackness condition implies that ϕ2 > 0.U s -
ing the same reasoning as in Case-I, the ﬁrst constraint binds and so ϕ1 > 0.T h u s ,( 5 . 7 )







(1 − ν2)(1− ξ)
(ν2 − ϕ2) (7.13)
Letting the solution to (7.13) be qH =
_






H) which implies that qV
H (ν2) ≤
_
qH (ν2). This case is valid till the ﬁrst
constraint just ceases to be binding in which case EV R
L >
_
qH∆c and, therefore, ϕ1 =0






C o m p a r i n gt ot h eﬁrst order condition under full information (3.7), the solution in this
case is qVR
H = qV ∗
H .H e n c e , qV ∗
H sets a upper limit on
_
qH (ν2) for the null contract to be
renegotiation-proof.
Summarizing the two cases, when qV
H (ν2)∆c ≤ EV O
L ≤ qV ∗
H ∆c, then the original
contract is renegotiation-proof.¥
Proof of Lemma 5 : The optimization problem is considered in two steps.
Step-I: Ignore the RP constraint and use the deﬁnition qY
2 ∆c = EV O
L , to substitute
out EV O
L from the objective function. Writing terms involving only qY
2 , the politician’s
objective is to choose qY
2 in order to maximize
−νq
Y
















The ﬁrst order condition with respect to qY




















(1 − ν1)(1− ξ)
∆c (7.15)
Comparing (7.15) with (4.9) it is obvious that the unconstrained (because the RP
constraint has been ignored) solution is qY
2 = qV
H (ν1).
33Step-II: On account of Bayesian updating, following the ﬁrst period choice of qY
1 ,p r i o r s
are revised downwards i.e. ν2 <ν 1.F r o m L e m m a 2 ,
∂qV
H
∂ν < 0,t h u s ,t h es o l u t i o nt ot h e
unconstrained problem, qV
H (ν1), is lower than the lower limit of the constraint, qV
H (ν2).
Therefore, the solution to the constrained problem is also qY
2 = qV
H (ν2). ¥











































q1 (ν1) ≥ qV
H (ν1). Lemma 5 shows that the output
contracted in the second period of a dynamic contract is qY
2 = qV
H (ν2).I ti se a s yt os h o w
that qV
H (ν1) <q V




from Lemma 2. From Remark 1 we know that whether greater shortages lead to an increase
or decrease in bribes depends on whether the contracted output is greater or lower than
qM, the output produced by a unregulated private monopolist.
The second order condition requires ∂2LR
∂(qY
1 )2 ≤ 0. Implicitly diﬀerentiating (5.9) with




















and this proves the second claim in the proposition. ¥
Proof of Proposition 8 : From (5.12), the coeﬃcient of δ is negative, so the “fully
pooling equilibrium” (π∗ =0 ) is always optimal when δ →∞ .I nt h ec a s eo fa“ f u l l y
separating equilibrium” (π∗ =1 )c h e c kt h a t
∂W(π)


















The computation of δC in (7.16) completes the proof. ¥
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